The battlefields of Israel and Ukraine made one thing painfully clear: drones are no longer just reconnaissance tools. They’re weapons.
On October 15, 2025, two explosive-laden drones struck the Fiscalía General del Estado Anti-Kidnapping Unit facility in Tijuana. No lives were lost, but the building and six vehicles were damaged, and the U.S. Consulate issued a security alert. This was not a test. It was a warning.
Transnational criminal organizations, cartels and terrorist actors have moved from experimentation to operational use. They’re improvising lethal payloads and employing swarms to overwhelm defenses. While federal and state policymakers continue to study counter-UAS strategies, adversaries are deploying capabilities today.
Archaic procurement processes and slow federal responses are throttling the ability of state and local law enforcement to buy, field and train with counter-UAS tools at the speed this threat requires.
Why procurement matters — and why it’s failing us
Many agencies already know what they need: detection systems, electronic mitigation, trained exploitation teams and forensic tools to analyze recovered UAVs. But acquiring those capabilities is often hamstrung by procurement rules designed for a different era — guidelines that favor long contracts, slow vendor vetting and complex interagency approvals.
Even when federal grant money exists, eligibility rules or timing often make it impractical for rapid fielding. The result: capability gaps at the local level. It’s not that officers aren’t ready or willing — it’s that the system meant to support them is failing.
Equipment and training must be fully vetted and operationally reliable. No agency has the budget for a hit-or-miss solution. Until acquisition and deployment processes are streamlined, these gaps will persist, leaving communities exposed.
One day, after a drone swarm strikes critical infrastructure, Americans may rightly ask: How did we let this happen?
A growing threat to infrastructure and safety
Weaponized drones threaten everything from border facilities and public-safety infrastructure to utilities and mass-gathering events. A coordinated attack against a power substation, water treatment plant, or transit hub could trigger cascading failures far beyond the initial blast.
These are not hypotheticals. The technologies to weaponize small UAVs are cheap, accessible and spreading rapidly.
What police departments can do now
While we press for faster federal support, agencies can take immediate steps to reduce risk and strengthen resilience.
Update threat assessments:
Treat UAVs as a top-tier threat in critical-infrastructure and event planning. Include weaponized drones in active shooter, hazmat, and mass-casualty scenarios.
Run tabletop and live exercises:
Simulate drone-delivered threats and swarms. Test communications, rules of engagement, evacuation routes, and coordination with public works and utilities.
Leverage interagency partnerships:
Work with fusion centers, the FBI, DHS, emergency management, National Guard CBRN units, and neighboring agencies to share detection data and coordinate response.
Use interim procurement strategies:
Pursue cooperative purchasing agreements, mutual-aid contracts and rapid-acquisition authorities where available. Consider modular detection kits and portable forensic tools that can be fielded quickly.
Train for exploitation and evidence collection:
Train personnel in exploitation procedures, evidence collection, and interviewing techniques for CAUS (Counter-UAS) investigations. Ensure they know how to safely secure, transport, and preserve downed drones for forensic analysis. Build relationships with federal labs and request assistance through FBI Legat channels when needed.
Prioritize public messaging and continuity planning:
Develop clear communication plans to counter misinformation and prevent panic. Coordinate with utilities and private-sector partners on continuity of operations.
Seek targeted funding:
Pursue OJP, DHS and state homeland-security grants aggressively. Document capability gaps to justify emergency funding requests.
What the federal government must do
This is not a critique of the federal professionals who are eager to support the state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) mission. But the Tijuana attack highlights the transnational nature of this threat — and the need for cross-border forensic and investigative cooperation now underway through initiatives like FBI rapid-deployment teams.
Federal agencies must expedite procurement processes, release flexible funding, and deliver deployable capabilities and training at operational speed. Specifically:
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Provide pre-cleared, rapid-acquisition authorities for counter-UAS equipment to state and local agencies.
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Fund and preposition mobile digital forensic labs and rapid-deployment UAV exploitation teams regionally.
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Expand training programs such as the Huntsville, Alabama, UAS & C-UAS Test Range that facilitates training and development for uncrewed aerial systems for military and public safety agencies. It also supports technology development for private sector and academic institutions.
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Support short-term task forces to help departments analyze threats and pursue prosecutions.
The time to act
Having seen drones weaponized on distant battlefields — and now on our doorstep — we must treat this as an urgent public safety issue. The American law enforcement community is not slowing its response, it is draconian regulations and outdated procurement rules that are holding us back.
The administration has begun working with SLTT partners to accelerate capabilities and deliver the tools, training and authorities needed to respond. But time is short.
If we do not act decisively now, we risk leaving the safety of the American people — and the security of our critical infrastructure — in the hands of those eager to exploit our inaction.
Tactical takeaway
Police leaders can’t rewrite federal procurement law — but they can train, plan, and build local partnerships now. Readiness within the rules beats waiting for a fix that may come too late.
Does your agency include drone-related threats in tabletop or active-shooter exercises? If not, what would it take to start? Share below.